Call the National Militia House of Representatives or Senate

Power to Declare War

"The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United states."
—U.Southward. Constitution, Commodity I, section eight, clause ane

"The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and brand Rules apropos Captures on Land and Water;
"To raise and support Armies, simply no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall exist for a longer Term than two Years;
"To provide and maintain a Navy;
"To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the state and naval Forces;
"To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
"To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Function of them as may be employed in the Service of the The states, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the subject prescribed by Congress"
—U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 8, clauses 11–16

Origins

Like many powers articulated in the U.S. Constitution, Congress' authority to declare war was revolutionary in its design, and a articulate break from the past when a scattering of European monarchs controlled the continent's affairs.

The framers of the Constitution—reluctant to concentrate too much influence in the hands of as well few—denied the office of the President the authority to go to state of war unilaterally. If America was going to survive as a republic, they reasoned, declarations of war required conscientious fence in open forums amid the public's representatives.¹

"The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making powers to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the post-obit reasons," a young first-term Congressman named Abraham Lincoln wrote in 1848 during America'south War with Mexico. "Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our [Ramble] Convention understood to exist the near oppressive of all Kingly oppressions and they resolved to then frame the Constitution that no i man should concur the power of bringing this oppression upon us."²

Constitutional Framing

/tiles/non-collection/i/i_origins_biennal_elections_madison_hc.xml Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives
About this object James Madison was an integral office of the constitutional framing of the House.

Initially, delegates to the Ramble Convention discussed America'due south war powers in general terms, briefly mentioning the "common defence force, security of liberty and general welfare" of the land's citizens.ⁱⁱⁱ Then in early June, 1787, Charles Pinkney of Due south Carolina argued for "a vigorous Executive," reopening the war powers issue. But to requite the office war-making powers would turn the President into an elected monarch, Pinkney argued. Other delegates, including John Rutledge of South Carolina, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and James Madison of Virginia agreed, last that the powers of war and peace were all-time reserved for the national legislature.^iv

By August, the framers had yet to decide where to vest the country'southward state of war powers. Pierce Butler of South Carolina favored the Executive part as best suited to make war. But there was a growing sense that such awe-inspiring responsibility belonged with the legislative branch. Non everyone was convinced that the House and Senate should share the power, all the same, and Pinkney felt that since the Senate already had jurisdiction over treaties, it lone should have discretion to decide war matters every bit well.

Madison and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts sought a centre ground. For Gerry, giving a single part the entirety of the country's war powers contradicted the goals of a republic, and he and Madison proposed a quick edit, replacing "make" with "declare" so that the Constitution would read "Congress shall take power to declare war." The alter codified congressional authority but made the clause flexible enough to enable the President to defend the country during emergencies. The delegates worried that Congress would be out of session or would act also slowly if strange forces invaded America. So, despite their resolve to dilute Executive power, they gave the office an implied authority to "brand war" as an insurance policy of sorts for America's security.

Like George Mason of Virginia, the founders felt that war should be difficult to enter, and they expected congressional debate to restrain the war-making procedure.

On August 17, 1787, the land delegations agreed to strike "brand" and insert "declare" past a vote of 8 to 1 (initially it had been 7 to 2, simply Connecticut switched its position), and in doing so committed the war powers to Congress. "The constitution supposes, what the History of all Govts demonstrates," Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson a few years after, "that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & most decumbent to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of state of war in the Legisl."^half-dozen

Ramble Problems

Of the Constitution's many checks and balances, few accept become equally controversial and as consequential equally the country's war powers. Commodity I is clear in giving Congress the ability to declare war and to federalize country militias. But Commodity Two, section 2, names the President "Commander in Primary of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United states of america." Although the framers ensured that a civilian would lead America's military, constitutional scholars have debated for years whether the position of Commander in Master actually gives the President dominance to open hostilities or whether it was just a championship the Founders conferred on the chief magistrate.⁷

When combined with the President'due south implied privilege to brand state of war, the question of whether the Commander in Main carries additional power becomes an issue of vast constitutional result, something that'southward plagued the federal organization and its scholars over time.^eight While a close reading of the Convention debates suggests that the framers intended to limit Presidents to defensive actions, a number of administrations, especially afterwards World War Two, have broadly interpreted the notion of a defensive state of war and have committed U.S. armed forces without congressional potency only to ask for it afterwards, if they ask for information technology at all.^nine One recent study has described the Constitution'southward linguistic communication on initiating hostilities as "cryptic" and more than one scholar has described the Executive state of war power as "vague."¹⁰ In summarizing the relationship between 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and Capitol Loma, another political scientist has written recently that "the Constitution is a paradoxical mix of clearly defined state of war powers for Congress and unsaid prerogatives for the president," which over the years created "an uneasy residuum between the branches."¹¹

For well-nigh of U.Southward. history, the Constitution's checks and balances worked, and more oft than not Presidents sought the consent of Congress on war matters. The period following World State of war II, all the same, saw the President'due south war-making discretion reach a level that fabricated many legislators nervous. Past the early on 1970s, the relationship between the legislative and executive branches reached something of a tipping point.

The onset of the Cold War, combined with America's international obligations every bit a fellow member of the United nations (United nations) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), stretched the executive branch's foreign policy footprint to corners of the world that the framers of the Constitution could never have imagined. In the summer of 1950, for instance, the President ordered an American response to Democratic people's republic of korea's attack on Republic of korea, and subsequently committed footing forces in Korea after the Un Security Council asked for assistance.¹² And subsequently consecutive administrations committed America's military machine to combat operations in the Dominican Republic, Laos, and Vietnam without formally declaring war, Congress' mood soured to the point that it passed the State of war Powers Resolution in November 1973. As stated in the legislation, Congress drafted the War Powers Resolution "to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of Usa Military machine into hostilities." Since its enactment, nonetheless, the War Powers Resolution has had scant, if whatsoever, upshot on the military decisions of sitting Presidents. In fact, many administrations have simply "refused to recognize its constitutionality," co-ordinate to two political scientists who've studied Congress' power to influence the White Firm on state of war matters.¹³

Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force

/tiles/not-collection/4/4-20-War_gavel-2005_124_000.xml Drove of the U.S. House of Representatives
Nigh this object This gavel was used during the Dec 11, 1941, session in which the House approved the declarations of state of war against Deutschland and Italy. Gavels used in historically pregnant sessions were occasionally presented as memorabilia.

Since 1789, Congress has declared state of war 11 times, against 10 countries, during five separate conflicts: Great Britain (1812, War of 1812); Mexico (1846, War with Mexico); Spain (1898, Spanish-American State of war, also known as the War of 1898); Frg (1917, Globe War I); Austria-Republic of hungary (1917, Globe State of war I); Japan (1941, Globe War II); Germany (1941, World War Ii); Italy (1941, Globe War II); Bulgaria (1942, Earth State of war 2); Hungary (1942, World War 2); and Rumania (1942, World War II).¹⁴ In each of these 11 instances, the President appealed to Congress for authorization either in person before a Joint Session or in a written asking.¹⁵

Far more common, especially in the modernistic era, accept been congressional authorizations for the utilise of military machine force (AUMF) abroad. Historically, AUMFs take been much narrower in scope and much more than limited than formal declarations of state of war, such as when Congress gave the President clearance to protect American ships against French aggression in 1789 and against Tripoli's navy in 1802. After Earth War II, still, AUMFs became much broader, ofttimes granting Presidents sweeping authority to engage America'due south military effectually the world.¹⁶ Take, for instance, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964. Equally communist forces in Vietnam took increasingly militaristic deportment confronting U.South. forces, Congress authorized the President, in sweeping but vague linguistic communication, "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia."¹⁷

In fact, despite engaging in conflicts in places like Vietnam and Iraq over the last lxx years, Congress has not declared war since 1942. Rather, the private congressional AUMFs have been interpreted "equally fully empowering the President to prosecute the wars," according to law professors, Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith.¹⁸ Although the concept of the AUMF has existed since the get-go of the Republic, the specific use of the term became commonplace in the 1990s during the Gulf War.¹⁹

The House'southward Role

For nearly of the modern era, the Firm has acted chop-chop once Presidents accept requested formal declarations of war. Traditionally, the House Committee on Foreign Diplomacy has considered bills sending American troops to fight abroad, and in at least ane case, in 1924, the House has pulled "legislation tending to promote peace and discourage war" from the Judiciary Committee and referred it to the Commission on Military Affairs.²⁰ Commencement with Globe War II, all declarations of war have come before Congress as joint resolutions, and in each instance the House suspended the rules in club to quickly pass the measure.²¹

The decision to transport the nation to war is perhaps Congress's gravest responsibleness, and in the House war votes can be solemn, weighty occasions. For the Members, to declare war against a strange ability is to send their constituents, their neighbors, their family unit, and fifty-fifty themselves into impairment's style.

One solar day later on Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in early December 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt addressed a Articulation Session of Congress, laying out his cause for war. When the House gathered immediately afterwards to discuss Roosevelt's request, Jeannette Rankin of Montana repeatedly sought recognition to address the chamber. Twenty-4 years earlier, Rankin had voted confronting America'southward entry into World War I, and on the eve of World State of war 2, fifty-fifty every bit the war resolution against Nihon went through its first reading, Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas, who witnessed Rankin's previous vote in 1917, refused to recognize her. As Members prepared for the final vote, many approached Rankin hoping to convince her to vote for the war; at the very least they hoped she would vote present, or abstain all together. When the reading clerk reached her name during the roll call on the resolution's final passage, Rankin voted no, the only vote against. The bill passed 388–1. "Equally a woman I can't go to war," she said, "and I decline to transport anyone else." After the sleeping accommodation erupted in protest to her vote, Rankin waited in a phone booth before the Capitol Police escorted her dorsum to her office.

With 1 exception early on, votes to declare war in the House tended to laissez passer with overwhelming majorities. Declaring state of war or passing an AUMF, however, is merely the first step. Once the fighting begins, Congress assumes some other constitutional part: that of oversight.

Country (State of war)	Appointment	Business firm Vote
Swell Britain (War of 1812)	June 4, 1812	79–49
Mexico (War with Mexico)	May eleven, 1846	174–14
Kingdom of spain (War of 1898)	April 25, 1898	Vocalism vote
Germany (Earth War I)	Apr 6, 1917	373–50
Austria-Republic of hungary (Globe War I)	Dec 7, 1917	365–1
Nippon (Earth War II)	December 8, 1941	388–i
Frg (World War II)	December 11, 1941	393–0
Italia (World War Two)	December 11, 1941	399–0
Bulgaria (World War 2)	June 3, 1942	357–0
Hungary (World War II)	June 3, 1942	360–0
Rumania (World War II)	June 3, 1942	361–022

For Further Reading

Bradley, Curtis A. and Jack Fifty. Goldsmith, "Congressional Authorization and the State of war on Terrorism." Harvard Law Review 118 no. 7 (2005): 2047–2133.

Burgess, Susan R. "War Powers." In The Encyclopedia of the United States Congress, edited by Donald C. Salary, et al., vol. 4, pages 2097–2100. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Cannon'due south Precedents of the Firm of Representatives of the The states. Book seven, §1894. GPO: Washington, D.C., 1935.

Deschler'due south Precedents of the Business firm of Representatives of the United States. Volume iii, Chapter 13, §three–eleven. Washington, D.C.: Regime Press Role, 1976–1977.

Elsea, Jennifer One thousand. and Matthew C. Weed. "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of War machine Strength: Historical Background and Legal Implications." Congressional Inquiry Service, 18 April 2014, RL31133.

Fisher, Louis. President and Congress: Ability and Policy. The Free Press: New York, 1972.

_____. Presidential War Power. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1995.

_____. Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President. 4th edition. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1997.

_____. Congressional Abdication on War and Spending. College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2000.

_____. "Clinton's Military machine Activity: No Rivals in Sight." In Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations, edited by James A. Thurber, pages 229–254. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Fowler, Linda L. "Congressional War Powers." In The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress, edited by Eric Schickler and Frances Eastward. Lee, pages 812–833. Oxford Academy Press, 2011.

Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States. Vol. 4, §4164. GPO: Washington, D.C., 1907.

Howell, William G. and Jon C. Pevenhouse. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Katzmann, Robert A. "War Powers Resolution." In The Encyclopedia of the United States Congress, vol.. four, edited by Donald C. Salary, et al., pages 2100–2102. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Kriner, Douglas L. After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War. Chicago: Academy of Chicago Press, 2010.

Torreon, Barbara Salazar. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015." Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2015. R42738.

Weed, Matthew C. "The State of war Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice." Congressional Inquiry Service, 3 April 2015. R42699

Zeisberg, Mariah. State of war Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.

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Source: https://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/War-Powers/

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